

Unsafe Harbor Statement

- This room is an unsafe harbor
- You can rely on the information in this presentation to help you protect your data, your databases, your organization, and your career
- No one from Oracle has previewed this presentation
- No one from Oracle knows what I am going to say
- No one from Oracle has supplied any of my materials
- Everything I present is existing, proven, functionality



Last Week

The Cybersecurity Industry Makes Millions, But Is It Keeping Us Safe?

The cybersecurity industry is booming. As thousands meet at the RSA security conference, it's fair to wonder: What are all these companies actually doing?



Last year, investors poured <u>\$5 billion in cybersecurity startups</u>. The whole industry will be worth \$170 billion in three years, <u>according to a recent estimate</u>. There's so many infosec companies that it's becoming difficult to keep track of them all. And yet, are we all any more secure? Is the infosec industry really keeping us safe? Is it even focusing on the right problems?

Last Week





ADVERTISING/SPEAKING

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

A Little Sunshine / Data Breaches — 7 comments


31 NY Investigates Exposure of 885 Million Mortgage Documents


New York regulators are investigating a weakness that exposed 885 million mortgage records at **First American Financial Corp.** [NYSE:FAF] as the first test of the state's strict new cybersecurity regulation. That measure, which went into effect in March 2019 and is considered among the toughest in the nation, requires financial companies to regularly audit and report on how they protect sensitive data, and provides for fines in cases where violations were reckless or willful.

On May 24, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that First American had just fixed a weakness in its Web site that exposed approximately 885 million documents — many of them with Social Security and bank account numbers — going back at least 16 years. No authentication was needed to access the digitized records.

Mailing List Subscribe here

"/javascript/loginform.js"
hen you see a trillion--><
nte Get the y"></cent
seintelligent ty o
plintelligent ta
"https://threate're t
where protection type= protection type= protection type= protection() (consolet that comes d("t





Daniel Morgan and DBSecWorx, Copyright 1998-2019, All Rights Reserved


Daniel A. Morgan

- Managing Director: Database Security Worx
- Oracle ACE Director Alumni
- Oracle Educator
 - Adjunct Professor, University of Washington, Oracle Program, 1998-2009
 - Consultant: Harvard University
 - Guest lecturer at universities in Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, New Zealand, Norway, Panama
 - Frequent lecturer at Oracle conferences ... 132 countries (42 unique) since 2008
- IT Professional
 - Celebrating 50 years of IT in 2019
 - First computer: IBM 360/40 in 1969: Fortran IV
 - Oracle Database and Beta Tester since 1988-9
 - The Morgan behind www.morganslibrary.org
 - Member Oracle Data Integration Solutions Partner Advisory Council
 - Member Board of Directors, Northern California Oracle Uses Group
- damorgan@dbsecworx.com




System/370-145 system console

My Personal Website ... (zero advertising, zero tracking)



Travel Log: Galapagos Islands, Ecuador 2014





Security

What is security

Data **security** refers to protective digital privacy measures that are applied to **prevent** unauthorized access to computers, databases and websites. Data security also protects data from corruption. Data security is an essential aspect of IT for organizations of every size and type.

Data security is also known as **information security (IS)** or computer security.

- If someone breaks into your house, steals everything you own, gets your passport, your social security card, and uses them to clean out your bank and investment accounts auditing will explain what happened after your mortgage payment bounces
- Auditing, after the damage is already done, tells you what you wouldn't have lost if you had focused your efforts on improving security



Daniel Morgan and DBSecWorx, Copyright 1998-2019, All Rights Reserved

American Lack of Attention to Details



SCIENCE POLICY CARS GAMING & CULTURE STORE FORUMS

SUBSCRIBE

Q ≡ SIGN IN →

STORING PASSWORDS LIKE IT'S 1999 —

Plain wrong: Millions of utility customers' passwords stored in plain text

"It's ridiculous vendors are replying to researchers via general counsel, not bug bounty."

JIM SALTER - 2/25/2019, 6:30 AM





In September of 2018, an anonymous independent security researcher (who we'll call X) noticed that their power company's website was offering to email—not reset!—lost account passwords to forgetful users. Startled, X fed the online form the utility account number and the last four phone number digits it was asking for. Sure enough, a few minutes later the account password, in plain text, was sitting in X's inbox.

This was frustrating and insecure, and it shouldn't have happened at all in 2018. But this turned out to be a flaw common to websites designed by the Atlanta firm SEDC. After finding SEDC's copyright notices in the footer of the local utility company's website, X began looking for more customer-facing sites designed by SEDC. X found and confirmed SEDC's footer—and the same offer to email plain-text passwords—in more than 80 utility company websites.

The Threat Map (1:2)




https://threatmap.checkpoint.com/ThreatPortal/livemap.html

The Threat Map (2:2)


- What you just looked at is both real and real-time
- This is not the work of a bunch of bored teenagers and script kiddies
- This is the work of dedicated IT professionals
- 99+% of it comes from one of two sources
- Organized crime organizations ... if they gain access your data will be sold on the dark web or used to create or control bank or credit card accounts
- Nation-States ... if they gain access your data will be used to attack our country, our economy, your community, your employer and your family
- This is NOT hyperbole ... this is reality

Database Risks


- Most databases break-ins are never detected and never reported
- What you hear about is the part of the iceberg above the water
- Database related risks fall into three broad categories
 - Data Theft
 - Data Alteration
 - Transforming the database into an attack tool
- To accomplish these activities requires gaining access and doing so generally falls into one of the following categories
 - Pfishing, if necessary for credentials
 - Utilizing granted privileges and privilege escalation
 - Access to Oracle built-in packages
 - SQL Injection



Oracle Management & Security Cloud (1:2)



Oracle Management & Security Cloud (2:2)



We Cannot Win By Buying Products ... We Must Change The Rules

- Our databases and data are not being attacked fingers on keyboards
- The attackers do not come to work between 8am and 5pm Monday Friday
- They don't get called into meetings
- Their phone doesn't ring
- They don't go out to lunch
- They don't go home after work
- They don't take off weekends and holidays
- They don't get sick leave
- They don't go on vacation
- They are bots



If we fight this war as humans vs bots we will always lose


We Can Only Win The War If We Fight As Equals



Lee Sedol

Anyone want to play chess against Deep Blue?
Anyone rational person think they can beat AlphaGo?

Office of Program Management (1:5)



Office of Program Management (2:5)

0

What happened during the OPM cybersecurity incidents announced in 2015?

In 2015, OPM announced malicious cyber activity on its network and identified **two separate but related cybersecurity incidents** that have impacted the data of Federal government employees, contractors, and others. First, OPM discovered malicious cyber activity on its network resulting in the exposure of the personnel data of approximately 4.2 million current and former Federal government employees. Second, OPM discovered malicious cyber activity on its network resulting in the exposure of the background investigation records of approximately 21.5 million individuals, primarily current, former, and prospective Federal employees and contractors.



Office of Program Management (3:5)

- Did OPM have governance requirements?
- Did OPM have regulatory requirements?
- Did OPM pass its compliance audits?
- Did OPM meet or exceed NIST requirements?
- Did OPM hire qualified security professionals?
- Did OPM hire qualified network, storage, system, and database admins?
- Did OPM have a firewall?
- Did OPM monitor network activity?
- Did OPM patch its firmware and software?
- Did OPM use userids, passwords, and multi-factor authentication?

But none of this has anything to do with data and database security

Office of Program Management (4:5)

 OPM pretends the breach perpetrated by the People's Republic of China was for purposes of obtaining credit cards

seriously ... they offered all of us whose data was taken free credit reports

what did they think the People's Liberation Army was going to do with my DOB and SSN?

go shopping at Tiffany's? get a stereo system at Best Buy? get an AmEx card?

What You Can Do

Here are steps you can take to protect your identity:

- Spot the warning signs of identity theft
- Be aware of phishing scams
- Update your passwords
- Get up to speed on computer security
- If you think your identity has been stolen
- Learn how to keep your information safe from exploitation
- Tips for practicing safe online behavior every day

Office of Program Management (5.5)

- Perhaps I like to live dangerously but for some reason I didn't consider it likely the PLA would be selling my finger prints, photographs, and family history to identity thieves
- So I didn't sign up and volunteer to a credit bureau that I had applied for a security clearance
- Further compromising what was left of my identity

What We're Doing to Help

Supporting people who have been impacted

Identity theft restoration and credit monitoring services have been provided at no cost to individuals whose information was compromised in the OPM cyber incidents. Certain services are also available to the dependent minor children of impacted individuals who were under the age of 18 as of July 1, 2015. These services include:

- Full service identity restoration, which helps to repair your identity following fraudulent activity.
- Identity theft insurance, which can help to reimburse you for certain expenses incurred if your identity is stolen.
- Continuous identity and credit monitoring

If you've received a notification letter and PIN code from OPM, please sign up for MyIDCare.

Instructions on how to enroll in other services were included in your notification. If you have not yet received a notification but believe you were impacted by the 2015 cybersecurity incidents please visit the Verification Center .


An Unpleasant Fact

- Governance is NOT security
- Auditing is NOT security
- Compliance is NOT security
- The overwhelming majority of encryption does not enhance security

- In all of the news reports about all of the break-ins and data thefts
- Have you ever heard or seen the following announced?

Computers belonging to [company] were broken into, data on [###] billions of credit cards was stolen and the [company] failed to pass their compliance and security audits?

- You likely never will
- Victims of database breaches pass their audits ... proving audits and penetration tests are not the same as to securing data ... so what is?



Firewalls (1:4)

- Most organizations equate security with perimeter defense
- They have a firewall
- The following example is real and came from a customer security audit
- The firewall's configuration, discovered during the audit, allowed direct access from the internet to the database servers
- The organization's employees did not fully understand the implications of the rules they were writing

```
set security policies from-zone UNTRUST to-zone Business-Data policy BD-Ping match source-address any set security policies from-zone UNTRUST to-zone Business-Data policy BD-Ping match destination-address any set security policies from-zone UNTRUST to-zone Business-Data policy BD-Ping match application junos-ping set security policies from-zone UNTRUST to-zone Business-Data policy BD-Ping then permit set security policies from-zone UNTRUST to-zone Business-Data policy BD-Ping then log session-close
```

Firewalls (2:4)

- The fact that a firewall has been purchased and configured should give you no sense of comfort
- Here is another firewall rule setting discovered during a security audit
- This example cancels the stateful feature of the firewall and make it just like a switch or router with security rules (ACLs)
- All traffic is allowed both from/to the outside interface with security level 0

```
1094 access-list INBOUND-CAMPUS extended permit ip any any 3735 access-group INBOUND-CAMPUS in interface OUTSIDE 1096 access-list OUTBOUND-CAMPUS extended permit ip any any 3736 access-group OUTBOUND-CAMPUS out interface OUTSIDE dc-fwsm-db configurations

access-list INBOUND-CAMPUS extended permit ip any any access-group INBOUND-CAMPUS in interface OUTSIDE access-list OUTBOUND-CAMPUS extended permit ip any any access-group OUTBOUND-CAMPUS out interface OUTSIDE
```

The History of Perimeter Defense

- There is no wall that cannot be breached by a determined enemy
- The "impenetrable" Maginot Line was easily penetrated in WWI
- Firewalls are easily penetrated
- Identity Management is easily defeated ... I can defeat your LDAP system and so can you
- The only strategy that works is the one that has proven itself for thousands of years ... defense in depth

Breach exposes at least 58 million accounts, includes names, jobs, and more

With 2 months left, more than 2.2 billion records dumped so far in 2016.

DAN GOODIN - 10/12/2016, 2:29 PM




Firewalls (3:4)


Every Oracle Database deployment requires multiple network connections

Name	Protocol	Utilization
Management	TCP/IP	System Admin connection to the server's light's-out management card
Public	TCP/IP	Access for applications, DBAs, exports, imports, backups: No keep-alive if RAC
SAN Storage	Fibre Channel	Server connection to a Storage Area Network (SAN)
NAS Storage	TCP/IP or IB	Connection to an NFS or DNFS mounted storage array
RAC Cache Fusion interconnect	UDP or IB	Jumbo Frames, no keep-alive, with custom configured read and write caching
Replication	TCP/IP	Data Guard and GoldenGate
Backup and Import/Export	TCP/IP	RMAN, DataPump, CommVault, Data Domain, ZFS, ZDLRA

- Every one of these networks provides access to data
- No conversation on networking is complete without considering firewalls, DNS and NTP servers, load balancers, and a large variety of mobile and Internet of Things devices
- How many of the networks, above, go through the firewall?
- Probably only one of them ... the others probably shouldn't
- But each of them is an unmonitored vector for attack


Example of a Minimum Network Environment





Today: I Need To Change The Way You Think


If Maxwell House Coffee is "good to the last drop"



- What's wrong with the last drop?
- Don't focus on what was said
- Focus on what should have been said but wasn't


Pay Attention To What Should Have Been Said ... But Wasn't

- Have you ever heard that an organizations that was the victim of a major breach failed an audit?
- Have you ever heard that any organization that was the target of a major breach configured all default security options correctly?
- Have you ever heard that any organization that was the target of a major breach applied all available and relevant security patches?



How Database Breaches Really Occur (1:2)

- 48% involve privilege misuse
- 40% result from hacking




- 38% utilized malware
- 28% employed social engineering
- 15% physical attacks

Percentages do not add up to 100% because many breaches employed multiple tactics in parallel or were outliers

How Database Breaches Really Occur (2:2)

- 48% involve privilege misuse
- 40% result from hacking




- 38% utilized malware
- 28% employed social engineering
- 15% physical attacks

How are you going to prevent access from someone that has a valid userid and password?

The correct answer is not MFA ... MFA can be defeated with a screw driver

We Are Often Misdirected By Our Suppliers and Vendors

- A great tool for selling Data Masking, Data Redaction, and Advanced Security Option
- Not so great at doing what its title says it does



First Paradigm Shift

To be successful you must accept that ...

Break-ins will occur.

Those who fail to study history are doomed to repeat it.



Second Paradigm Shift

To be successful you must accept that ...

Your job is to increase the difficulty for those breaking in.

If your management doesn't grasp this reality then it is your responsibility to explain it to them.

Securing existing databases is more important than deploying more insecure databases.



Third Paradigm Shift

To be successful you must accept that ...

The database must be configured to limit the damage.

On Installation


- Disable the DEFAULT profile
- Revoke almost all privileges granted to PUBLIC
- Enable all of the database's default security capabilities

After Installation


- Apply security patches immediately
- Stop using cron use DBMS SCHEDULER
- Change passwords regularly automate the process
- Do not grant the CONNECT, RESOURCE, or DBA roles ever
- Use Proxy Users for every connecting user you create
- Implement Database Vault
- Implement Row Level Security
- There is always someone inside the firewall
- There is always someone with access
- There is a big difference between accessing one record ... and accessing everything
- Most databases in the are configured so that once someone breaks in they get everything
- Make it impossible to SELECT all rows




Defense in Depth



What each of these drawings, from different sources, has in common is that the data is that which must be protected






If no one can penetrate your network, but they can still get to your data, you lose the game ... and there are no replays

If everyone could penetrate the network but no one could get to the data ... you win

What You Are Going To Learn Today

- To protect data you must secure databases
- Perimeter defense, alone, is of little value
- Data security, for some products, means protecting database access
- Security with other database products is more difficult to achieve
- Today we will use an Oracle Database
 - On a laptop
 - Not connected to an organization's network
 - Without a valid userid and password
 - To attack the an organization
- All commercial and open source databases are, by default, insecure
 - The same basic skill set than can compromise Oracle will compromise SQL Server, MongoDB, Cassandra, PostgreSQL, MySQL, all of them
 - The specific vulnerabilities may be different
 - The specific exploit and syntax may be different
 - It is the thought process and the concepts that create a successful attack





Both of These Train Wrecks Were Avoidable

```
DIR=/opt/oracle/scripts
. /home/oracle/.profile db
DB NAME=hrrpt
ORACLE SID=$DB NAME"1"
export ORACLE SID
SPFILE=`more $ORACLE HOME/dbs/init$ORACLE SID.ora | grep -i spfile`
PFILE=$ORACLE BASE/admin/$DB NAME/pfile/init$ORACLE SID.ora
LOG=$DIR/refresh $DB NAME.log
RMAN LOG=$DIR/refresh $DB NAME" rman".log
PRD PWD=sys pspr0d
PRD SID=hrprd1
PRD R UNAME=rman pshrprd
PRD R PWD=pspr0d11
PRD BK=/backup/hrprd/rman bk
SEQUENCE=`grep "input archive log thread" $PRD BK/bk.log | tail -1 | awk '{ print $5 }'`
THREAD=`grep "input archive log thread" $PRD BK/bk.log | tail -1 | awk '{ print $4 }'`
BK DIR=/backup/$DB NAME/rman bk
EXPDIR=/backup/$DB NAME/exp
                                        find "pwd" *
DMPFILE=$EXPDIR/exp sec.dmp
IMPLOG=$EXPDIR/imp sec.log
                                         grep -ril "pwd" /app/oracle/*
EXPLOG=$EXPDIR/exp sec.log
EXP PARFILE=$DIR/exp rpt.par
                                         ack pwd
IMP PARFILE=$DIR/imp rpt.par
uname=rman pshrprd
pwd=pspr0d11
rman target sys/$PRD PWD@$PRD SID catalog $PRD R UNAME/$PRD R PWD@catdb auxiliary / << EOF > $RMAN LOG
 run {
     set until $SEQUENCE $THREAD;
    ALLOCATE AUXILIARY CHANNEL aux2 DEVICE TYPE DISK;
    duplicate target database to $DB NAME;
EOF
```

Conclusions (2:3)

- It is difficult to dig yourself out of a hole after the sides have fallen in
- Very few organizations have employees with the skill set required to secure their databases and operational environments: Less than 1% of DBA "training" involves security
- If you don't have the internal skills to know what to protect and how to protect it you need to go outside your organization and ask for help



Our New Reality

There isn't room in IT for Conscientious Objectors



Conclusions

- Success requires that we develop a new approach to our jobs
- That we reprioritize securing existing systems over creating additional insecure systems
- We must lead our employers to an understanding that passing audits is not sufficient
- And that we implement no new feature before we understand the potential risks



